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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
FRANK E. DOUGLAS, and 
DRUE E. DOUGLAS, 
vs. 
R. C. DUVALL, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
Defendant and Respondent 
STATEJ\IENT OF FACTS 
In view of the points raised by Appellants in this 
appeal, a somewhat co1nprehensive statement of facts 
is necessary. As this is a law case, and the jury found 
the facts in favor of Respondent, the facts are to be 
viewed in a light favorable to Respondent, and the 
lower court will be affirmed if there is evidence to sup-
port the verdict. (Reynolds 'V. Clyde, - Utah, -, 
298 P. (2) 530.). 
The parties will hereafter be referred to as "Plain-
tiffs" and "Defendant". 
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The complaint of the plaintiffs discloses that it is 
predicated upon six separate and distinct transactions 
covering a period of well over t"\\7 0 years, namely, from 
March 24, 1950 to July 1, 1952. Each transaction ob-
viously constitutes a cause of action wholly separate 
and distinct from each of the others. For convenience 
they will be referred by the dates of their occurrence as 
alleged in the complaint as follo,vs : 11arch 2± 1950 
' ' October 27, 1950, December 4, 1950, ~Jay 17, 1951, De-
cember 26, 1951, and July 1, 1952. The notes are desig-
nated as Exhibits A to F, but are not included in the 
exhibits sent to this court, the ex..hibit sheet indicating 
that they were withdra"\\rn by plaintiff on ~ ovember 3, 
1955, long before this appeal was taken. 
The representations alleged to have been 1nade by 
defendant and upon which plaintiffs predicate the 
several causes of action are stated particularly, plain-
tiffs having amended their complaint at the conclusion 
of their evidence to conforn1 to "\vhat they believe to 
have been their proof. 
Defendant's answer raised, a1nong other defenses, 
the denial of any actionable fraud on his part, includ-
ing a denial of the 1naking of the alleged representations, 
and upon the con1plaint and such ans,ver, the case pro-
ceeded to jury trial before the Honorable Le,vis Jones. 
As each of the transactions constituted a separate and 
distinct cause of action, the burden "~as upon the 
plaintiffs to prove by clear and convincing evidence, 
(Pace v. Parrish, - [Ttah -, 2-17 P. (~) :273), each 
of the ele1nents of actionable fraud separately as to 
each transaction. These ele1nents have been defined 
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by this court in the case of Pace v. ParTishJ supra} to 
consist of the follovving: 
(1) That a representation was made; 
(2) Concerning a presently existing material fact; 
( 3) Which was false; 
( 4) Which the representor either 
(a) knew to be false, or 
(b) n1ade recklessly, knowing that he had 
insufficient knovvledge upon which to base 
such representation ; 
( 5) For the purpose of inducing the other party to 
act upon it; 
(6) That the other party, acting reasonably and in 
ignorance of its falsity; 
( 7) Did in fact rely upon it; 
(8) And was thereby induced to act; 
(9) To his injury and damage. 
To the end of attempting to prove their case, plain-
tiffs called the defendant as a witness. Counsel states 
(Page 42 of l)laintiffs' Brief) that the defendant was 
called and testified under the provisions of Rule 43 (b), 
U.R.C.P., but vve submit that such was not the case. 
Reference is made to Page 94 of the transcript of 
evidence as follows: 
"R. C. Duvall, called as a witness in behalf of 
plaintiffs, being first duly sworn, was examined 
and testified as follows:" 
We subn1it that in order to obtain the benefits of 
Rule 43 (b), the witness must be expressly called pur-
suant to the rule, and if he is not so called he is just 
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another witness for the party calling him. H award v. 
Swag art et al, 161 F (2) 651, Johnson v. Baltimore and 
0. Ry. Co., 208F (2) 633. Be that as it may, however 
his testimony, whether under Rule 43 (b), or otherwise: 
was before the jury, and the jury was entitled to accept 
it as the truth-which it obviously did. 
The facts of the case, as they "\vere presented by 
the testimony of competent witnesses, are as follows: 
In 1943 Mr. Duvall, the defendant, first becan1e in-
terested in the mining property in question, \Yhich was 
located just across the State line in Idaho, and \vhich 
is generally referred to as "the mine". It had thereto-
fore been worked to some extent, and test holes and 
some 100 to 150 feet of tunneling were in existence. In 
1945 he and a Mr. Berrett obtained an option covering 
some six or eight claims from the then owner, and later 
a lease upon these and "considerably more clain1s" in 
the area (Tr. 378-381). 
In 1945 they, together with a ~Ir. Froerer \Yho had 
also become interested, employed the services of a min-
ing engineer, R. E. Reddin, to explore the property, 
and under his direction during the next t\\O years, ex-
tensive additional exploratory \York, including dian1ond 
drilling, was done. ( Tr. 382-385). Follo,ving the com-
pletion of this "Tork, the~T einployed the serYies of Roger 
V. Pierce, a consulting 1nining engineer of 'vide ex-
perience (Tr. 230, 231), to evaluate the property. Mr. 
Pierce arranged for 1\Iiles P. Ro1nney~ a geologist then 
employed by U. S. Sn1elting & Refining Co1npany, to 
aid in this work. These 111en concluded that still ad-
ditional exploratory 'vork \vas desirable, and recom-
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mended additional tunneling. Under the direction and 
supervision of 1\Ir. Pierce and Mr. Romney considerable 
additional tunneling \Vas done, and at its conclusion in 
1949 1\Ir. Ron1ney delivered to the defendant a map upon 
which vvas reflected the lines of the tunnels, and upon 
,vhjch Mr. Romney had further noted the assay values 
of the discovered ore. (Tr. 386-397, Tr. 307, 406, 407.) 
These values, as so sho,vn by Mr. Romney, ranged 
in value from $3.50 per ton to $16.00 per ton. (Tr. 28). 
Having thus determined that the ore was present, 
these engineers next set about to find out if the gold 
eould be recovered therefrom on a profitable basis. To 
this end Mr. Pierce submitted samples to General Engi-
neering Company (Tr. 239), and more especially to 
American Cynamid Company. Following the making 
of extensive tests by American Cynamid Company in 
its eastern laboratories it submitted a long written report 
to l\!Ir. Pierce, vvhich he in turn submitted to the defend-
ant, together with his own written report and recom-
mendations. These reports are in evidence as Exhibits 
lA and 18.. 
By the report of American Cynamid Company it 
appeared that by following the process recommended 
by it, gold recoveries of 90% could be had from the ore 
from the mine. Pierce's report reflected that there had 
been as of that time found in the developed area (which 
was but a small part of the mining property), and reason-
able extensions beyond developed phases, "200,000 tons 
of proven and probable ore reserves having value of 
about $7.00 per ton". (Pg. 4 of Exhibit lA). The report 
went on to estimate mining costs, milling costs and roy-
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alties totaling $3.28 per ton, which on the basis of 90% 
recovery as reported by American Cynamid meant a 
profit of $3.02 per ton, or a grand total of $600,000.00 
for the 200,000 tons of ore. 
Based upon these reports, and the recommendations 
of Mr. Pierce and 1Ir. Romney, \vho \vere mining spec-
ialists, (Tr. 229-230 and 300-302 as to their qualificat-
ions), the defendant determined to atte1npt a mining and 
milling operation of the property. 
For this purpose a corporation, The Duvall Com-
pany, was for1ned in early 1950, with the stock therein 
issued primarily to the defendant, and his associates, 
~r. Berrett and 1\tfr. Froerer, and to members of their 
families. 
These three had theretofore put large su1ns of money 
into the preliminary work (of which defendant had con-
tributed from $30,000.00 to $35,000.00 (Tr. 466), and 
were without additional funds sufficient to defray the 
cost of the mill, esti1nated at $80,000.00 (Tr. ±02). The 
defendant decided to seek financing for the 1nill from 
personal friends and acquaintances of his to the a1nount 
of $60,000.00, \vi th hin1self, Berrett and Froerer putting 
up the other $20,000.00. The 1noney \Yas to be borro,ved 
in the name of the corporation at interest, and as an 
added inducen1ent to the lenders, he \vould give them 
blocks of stock in the eorporation out of his O\vn hold-
ings. Thus, they \vould be not only creditors, but stock-
holders. He \vas suecessful in interesting some six 
different persons in this pro grain "Tho thus loaned the 
corporation a total of $60,000.00. The plaintiff loaned 
$20,00.00 of this an1ount. The $60,000.00 so raised, with 
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the $20,000.00 loaned by defendant, Froerer and Berrett 
constituted the $80,000.00 estimated as necessary to build 
the mill and get it in operation (Tr. 405). This loan of 
the plaintiffs is the initial loan they claim was inducted 
bY the fraud of defendant, and is referred to as the 
transaction of March 24, 1950. It was evidenced by the 
note of the corporation payable to plaintiffs, and pay-
able on September 24, 1951. The note is in evidence 
as Exhibit A. In addition thereto plaintiffs received 
2,400 shares of defendants stock. (Tr. 66, 90, 418). 
At the time of the making of this loan plaintiffs 
came to defendant's office where he explained the pro-
position to them and what he had theretofore done by 
way of exploration. In this connection he showed Dr. 
Douglas the Romney map with Romney's figutes repre-
senting ore values. He also showed hi1n the Pierce 
report and the American Cynanid report, which they 
went over together. He told him that he (the defendant) 
was not a mining man, and that reliance had to be upon 
the basis of the engineering and laboratory reports (Tr. 
409-418). He also discussed with him the other indi-
viduals who were considering making loans, and re-
ceived so1ne suggestions frorn plaintiff ( Tr. 414). He 
discussed the fact that Mr. Romney was giving up his 
employment with United States Sn1elting and Refining 
Company to manage the operation (Tr. 415 ). 
He discussed the an1ount of ore that had as of then 
been blocked out, and referred to the Pierce report of 
200,000 tons. l-Ie discussed the fact that there were 
surface ;indications of additional tonnage, and that 
greater tonnage n1ight be developed through additional 
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development work, and that 300,000 tons might be devel-
oped (Tr. 422-424). He denied that he stated either in 
substance or effect that the Duvall Company had, as a 
result of diamond drilling, blocked out not less than 
300,000 tons of ore containing gold ranging in value 
from four dollars to fifty dollars per ton (as asserted 
by plaintiffs). (Tr. 443). 
He denied that he stated either in substance or effect 
that the ore averaged not less than $7.00 per ton. (Tr. 
444). 
He denied that he stated in substance or effect 
that the total cost of producing the gold from the ore 
was less than $3.50 per ton. ( Tr. 444). 
He denied that he stated in substance or effect, that 
a substantial profit would be realized from mining each 
ton of ore. (Tr. 444). 
He denied that he then kne'v that 1nining costs would 
exceed $3.50 per ton, but testified that he relied on the 
report in that regard. (Tr. 444). 
He denied that he stated in substance or effect 
that no investor would lose a penny. (Tr. 445). 
He also denied that he stated in substance or effect 
that he would not borrow n1ore 1noney than the con1pany 
could pay back out of profits fro1n the proven ore body. 
(Tr. 445 ). 
Those denial8 "Tere n1ade specifically 'vith respect 
to the loan of !farch 2-!-, 1950, and 'vere reiterated with 
regard to each subsequent loan. (Tr. 445). 
Following the raising of this initial $80,000.00, the 
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mill was constructed under the direction of Mr. Romney, 
and trial runs n1ade in the late summer of 1950, but 
returns "\vere low, and to attempt to rectify this Mr. 
Pierce and Mr. Romney recommended employing a min-
ing engineer by the name of Val Den1psey. ~Ir. Dempsey 
made an extensive study, and recommended incorpo-
rating changes into the operation (Tr. 425 ), (Exhibits 
4 and 5). Additional moneys were required to meet 
then current obligations, and defendant discussed with 
~1r. Douglas the matter of raising an additional 
$20,000.00 (Tr. 427-428). Mr. Douglas suggested assess-
ing the stockholders, but defendant pointed out to him 
that the stock was non-assessable. The money was how-
ever raised by further borrowings at that time, plain-
tiffs putting up $686.20 toward the required arnount, 
and defendant $12,000.00. Other stockholders loaned 
the balance. To evidence the plaintiffs' loan they re-
ceived the corporation's note for $686.20, dated October 
27, 1950, payable "\vith interest on July 27, 1951. (Ex-
hibit F, Tr. 427-429). 
This loan is the second transaction which plaintiffs 
claim was induced by defendant's fraud, plaintiffs claim-
ing that despite the fact they received a note to evidence 
the loan, and expected to be repaid, and knew the dif-
ference between a loan and an assessment, defendant 
represented it to them as an assessment. This the de-
fendant specificalJy denied. (Tr. 445). 
Because of inclement weather the mill closed down 
during the late fall of 1950, and during this period the 
engineers worked at trying to devise a process to im-
prove the percentage of gold recoveries. This included 
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extensive tests at the University of Utah, and tests by 
a mining engineer, J. H. Heginbotham. (Tr. 430). Their 
recommendations included changes in the mill itself, 
(Exhibit 6) and to aid in financing the san1e plaintiffs 
made a third loan to the corporation in the amount of 
$15,000. This loan was evidenced by a note dated 
December 4, 1950, payable August 10, 1951. (Exhibit B). 
In addition to the note they also received from defend-
ant 2,400 shares of his stock in the corporation. (Tr. 90). 
As of the date of this loan Dr. Douglas was elected to 
fill a vacancy on the corporation's board of directors, 
and thereafter served and acted as such (Tr. 435). 
In connection with this loan defendant denied 
specifically that he stated or represented in substance or 
effect that the company was doing well, or that it was 
shipping considerable ore and making a profit, or that 
he had opportunities to sell the mine for in excess of 
$2,000,000, or that it 'vas worth more than $2,000,000, 
all as asserted by plaintiffs. (Tr. 446-448). He made 
like denials 'vith respect to the later loans of May li, 
1951, December 26, 1951 and July 1, 1952. (Tr. 446). 
Operations "yere reconnnenced at the mine in the 
spring of 1951, but in April of that year there was a 
fire that destroyed certain of the mining facilities, and 
on May 17, 1951, plaintiffs loaned the corporation 
$5,000.00 to aid in restoring the1u. They again received 
the corporation's note payable July 2, 1951, (Exhibit 
C), to evidence the loan, and received from defendant 
250 shares of his stoek (Tr. 90, 436-437). 
In connection \Vi th the loan of Dece1nber 26, 1951, 
defendant further denied specifically that he stated that 
10 
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the loan would be necessary for a short period of time 
only, or until the next shipment of ore was received, all 
as asserted by plaintiffs. (Tr. 449). 
With the changes in the mill that had been incorpo-
rated under the directions of the engineers, gold re-
coveries still vvere not up to expectation. Accordingly,. 
when the mill closed in the fall of 1951, still further 
changes vvere recommended to the end of trying to in-
crease these recoveri'es, and to aid therein plaintiffs 
n1ade a further loan to the corporation in the amount of 
$15,000.00. This loan was evidenced by the note of the 
corporation, dated December 26, 1951, payable August 
15, 1952 (Exhibit D) and plaintiffs received 2000 shares 
of defendant's stock. (Tr. 90, 440). 
The final loan of $2,000.00 was made on July 1, 
1952, and was made at a time that the company was 
having trouble "\vith its well, and had to buy a new pump. 
This loan "\vas evidenced by the corporation's note pay-
able October 1, 1952 ( Exhibt E) and plaintiffs received 
200 shares of defendant's stock. ( Tr. 90, 443). 
No further loans "\Vere made by plaintiffs to the 
corporation, but the company continued its mining opera-
tions throughout the remainder of 1952, and to N ovem-
ber of 1953, at which time it closed. At no time did 
plaintiffs ever make demand upon the corporation for 
payment of any of the notes (Tr. 82). At the times the 
loans of December 26, 1951, and July 1, 1952, were made, 
the first four notes were all past due and unpaid. 
Following conclusion of the operations for 1953, 
the board of directors determined that under the then 
11 
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existing conditions it would be unwise to attempt further 
operations. The defendant testified as to a number of 
factors that had interposed since the operation com-
menced in 1950. These included primarily the outbreak 
and continuance of the Korean war 'vith the consequent 
sharp increase in costs of labor and materials, and the 
inability to derive percentage gold recoveries from the 
ore comparable to those obtained by American Cynanid 
Company in its laboratory tests and upon ,\~hich the 
operation had been based in the first instance. (Tr. 
127-130). He further testified that the mine did not run 
out of ore, but the proble1n involved mainly the inability 
to extract the gold from the ore with percentage re-
coveries high enough to offset costs. Total tonnage 
mined during the four years of the mining operation 
was 113,409 tons, and during this period there were 
total sales of gold to the United States Mint of $351,250.-
77 (Exhibit M). 
1\fost of the evidence is not in conflict. A conflict 
in the evidence did arise to some extent as to whether 
the defendant made the representations to plaintiffs 
upon 'vhich they rely as grounds for these fraud actions. 
Defendant denied categorically that he ever made those 
statements, either in substance or effect. Plaintiffs' 
testimony, "'"hile far fron1 confor1ning to the pleaded 
allegations in this respect, did to so1ne extent conflict 
with defendant's testin1ony. The solution to such con-
flicts, ho,vever, is the object of the jury syste1n, and 
the jury that tried these issues found in favor of the de-
fendant. Certainly there is evidence sufficient to sup-
port the verdict, whieh evidence is found not only in 
the testirnony of the defendant, but also in the corrobo-
12 
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rating testimony of the other witnesses for defendant, 
and particularly in the cross examination of the plain-
tiff, F. E. Douglas. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
Plaintiffs present their statement of points under 
som·e five headings for the purpose of argument. We 
will answer them in the same order. 
ARGU~IENT 
I. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN SUBMITTING 
THE MATTER TO THE JURY UPON SPECIAL 
INTERROGATORIES. 
At the outset it is to be observed that plaintiffs 
elected to plead six separate and distinct causes of action 
as a single cause, and resisted defendants efforts that 
they be required to separately state then1. Ho\vever, 
as each transaction was separate and distinct, the burden 
\vas on the plaintiffs as to any single transaction to 
prove by clear and convincing proof the nine elements 
essential to actionable fraud. Those nine elements were 
determined by this Court in the case of Pace v. Parrish, 
supra, and are hereinbefore set out at page 3 hereof. 
In submitting the case to the jury the court was 
accordingly confronted with the task of presenting it 
in such a way that the jury would find the issues, i.e., 
the essential elements, as to each transaction without 
regard to its findings as to any other transaction, for 
it is obvious that a finding as to one transaction \Vould 
be of no significance as to another transaction. To meet 
13 
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this difficult problem the court elected, as well it might 
under· Rule 49, U.R.C.P., to utilize the procedure of 
special interrogatories, and to require the jury to find 
. ' 
e1ther yes or no, as to each elen1ent essential to each 
transaction. Thus it submitted an interrogatory sep-
arately as to each element and as to each transaction. 
The court could do no less, because if the jury answered 
"No" to any interrogatory it would have the effect of 
defeating plaintiffs' cause of action as to that trans-
action only, leaving plaintiffs' remaining causes un-
touched by the effect of that particular negative answer. 
The Court could not, of course anticipate any neg-
ative answers, so it was obliged to submit interrogatories 
as to each elen1ent of each transaction down to and in-
cluding the final element of damages. 
True it is, that in submitting special interrogatories 
in the manner the court did, "Then the jury reached a 
negative answer to any transaction, that was the end of 
it, and there 'vas no necessity for the jury to answer any 
further as to that transaction. In the instant case the 
jury answered the first interrogatory as to each trans-
action, i. e., with regard to the making of the represen-
tations, in the negative, and there 'Yas no need for the 
jury to go further, and the court so instructed them 
(Instruction 3 ( 8) R. 50). However, as evidence of 
what they thought of the total in1propriety of plaintiffs' 
law suit, and despite the fact that they gave a negative 
answer to each of the first interrogatories and so found 
the representations \\'"ere not 1nade, they 'vent on and 
found each and every of the ren1aining elements of 
actionable fraud against the plaintiffs. Because of this, 
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plaintiffs assert an inconsistency exists in the answers 
of the jury, in that it is inconsistent, for example, for 
the jury to have answered first that the representations 
were not made, and second, to have further answered 
that they were not false. 
We do not agree that inconsistencies thus exist. 
While it was unnecessary for the jury, having found that 
the representations were not made, to make any further 
findings as to that transaction, it was not inconsistent 
form them so to do so long as the further findings were 
all in the negative. If a representation was not made, it 
could not, in the very nature of things, be false, or have 
been material, or have been relied upon, etc. It is only 
if there had been a subsequent affirmative answer that 
any contention of inconsistency could be urged. We 
submit, accordingly, that there was no inconsistency in 
complete negative answers to all of the interrogatories, 
and the cases cited by plaintffs have no application to 
the instant case. 
As pointed out by this court in the case of Pace v. 
Parrish, supra, 
"Wherever there is uncertainty or doubt in con-
nection with the correlation of interrogatori'es 
with each other and their an:.~nvers, they should 
be so interpreted as to harmonize with the find-
ings of the jury if that can reasonably be done." 
Certainly there is no difficulty in harmonizing the sub-
sequent negative answers with the first, and plaintiffs' 
contention is without merit. 
Plaintiffs further urge that there was no issue upon 
the matter of reliance, because plaintiffs testified they 
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did rely. The mere fact that they so testified does not 
remove the issue, as there were many other factors 
that the jury was entitled to consider in connection with 
the question of reliance. There is the fact that plain-
tiff Dr. Douglas, was intimately associated with the 
project from the first, (Tr. 465) his visits to the n1ine, 
(Tr. 318, 465) his conferences with the operating n1ana-
ger, (Tr. 318) the fact that the company \vas frequently 
in need of additional funds, the fact of his directorship, 
(Tr. 131, 132, 458) the fact that he was making loans 
when he held already past due notes, (Tr. 78, 82) and a 
multitude of other matters. (Tr. 462-464) Certainly 
the jury \vas justified in disbelieving his affirmation 
of reliance in the light of all these other circun1stances. 
Further than that, however, is the fact that as the jury 
found on competent evidence that the representations 
were not made, he could not, despite his protestations 
of reliance, have relied upon son1ething that did not 
exist. 
Plaintiffs' final contention under this point is that 
the court did not give their requested instructions 3 
and 4. Instruction 3 relates to defendant's position in 
the community as an inducen1ent to plaintiffs to lend 
their 1noney, and Instruction 4 to bad 1noti\Te. The full 
and con1plete ans\\~er to this contention is that the fail-
ure to give the instructions, \Yhether the~~ \Yere proper 
or not, was not prejudicial to plaintiffs. These requests 
had nothing \vhateYer to do w·ith \Yhether the represen-
tations \Yere 1uade, and the jury having found that they 
\vere not n1ade, any question of position in the com-
ntunity, 1notive or anything else becon1es wholly incon-
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sequential, and any error in connection therewith, assum-
ing it did exist, is non-prejudicial. 
The sole material issue is whether the court was 
justified in subn1itting to the jury the question of 
·whether the representations \Vere made. As to this, 
there is no contention that there was not sufficient evi-
dence fron1 defendant's standpoint to go to the jury, or 
that the finding of the jury is not supported by com-
petent evidence. Such being the case, the manner of 
submission of the other possible issues, including in-
structions thereon, is of no consequence, because if the 
representations \Vere not made, and the jury so found 
as a fact, there were and are no other issues in the case. 
Other assertions made by plaintiffs under this point 
of argument should not go unchallenged, although \vholly 
immaterial in the light of the finding by the jury that 
the clai1ned representations \Vere not n1ade. For ex-
ample, plaintiffs assert (Pg. 13 of their brief) that the 
Pierce Report disclosed "that there was no ore of co1n-
1nercial value on the property". On the contrary this 
report shows on its face that in Pierce's opinion there 
was a profit of not less than $600,000.00 to be made 
from the then blocked out ores (Exhibit lA, Page 4). 
They assert that the alleged representation that 
there was 300,000 tons of ore blocked out by diamond 
drilling was of material significance. Certainly this 
court will recognize that the only material issue on ore 
tonnage was \Vhether the ore \Vas there, not whether it 
·was blocked out, and 1nuch less whether it \vas blocked 
out by diamond drilling as distinguished from tunnel-
ling or some other exploratory method. Further, the 
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question of whether it was represented that there was 
200,000 tons or 300,000 tons completely loses any sig-
nificance in view of the fact that the operation ulti-
mately closed down after having mined only 113,409 
tons, and for reasons completely disassociated fron1 any 
question of whether there were 200,000 or 300,000 tons. 
And finally, there was absolutely no proof of falsitv of 
ol 
the existence of 300,000 tons assuming that much was 
represented. 
Plaintiffs also assert that the court erred in failing 
to give their requ'ested instruction No. 4 charging that 
bad motive is not an essential element of fraud. 
We submit · that the court presented all of the 
essential elements to the jury, and having submitted 
the essential elements there was no duty to go further 
and instruct on "'\Vhat were not ele1nents. Further than 
that, there was and could be no prejudice in view of the 
jury's finding that no representations were made. 
Finally plaintiffs complain generally because, as 
they put it, the court did not instruct fully and conl-
pletel~,. upon the la\\T of fraud. \\'ithout conceding that 
the court so failed, "'\Ye sub1nit that by the use of the 
sp·ecial interrogatories any need for full and complete 
instructions upon the la"'\Y generally \vas eliminated. 
That is one of the functions of the use of special inter-
rogatories. 
In JJloores Fcde1·al Practice, r:rolznne 5, Page 2207, 
the author, in eonunenting on the use of general instruct-
ions in connection \\Tith ipecial interrogatories or special 
verdicts under Rule 49, observes: 
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H Use of the special verdict elemina tes the neces-
sity for and use of complicated instructions on 
the law, which are a normal concomitant of the 
general verdict. * * *. When the special verdict 
is used the court should give the jury only such 
explanation and instructions as it deems neces-
sary to enable the jury to 1nake intelligent find-
ings upon the issues of fact submitted." 
In 88 C.J.S. Trial, Page 952, it is thus stated: 
"Where special issues are submitted or a special 
verdict is required, it is in1proper to instruct the 
jury on the law of the case, and only sufficient 
instructions as to the general law should be given 
as will enable the jury to answer the questions 
intelligently." 
And in 53 Anz. Jur, Trial, Page 638: 
"'Where a special verdict is required, it is im-
proper to instruct the jury generally concerning 
the la'v of the case, for the reason that inasmuch 
as the jury are not to apply the la\Y to the facts, 
instructions as to the law can serve no useful 
purpose." 
POINT II. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN ITS 
INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY 
This is a continuation to some extent to some of 
the matters considered under Point I. Plaintiffs here, 
however, make further claims of error in regard to the 
instructions, which we will anwer specifically. 
Plaintiffs first contend that the court should have 
instructed the jury that they should find the represen-
tations were made if made in "substance and effect". 
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An examination of the record will show the lack of 
merit to the contention. 
Plaintiffs' original complaint was based upon defi-
nite and specific representations affirmatively asserted 
to have been made. (R. 1-2). At the conclusion of their 
evidence they amended their complaint to assert other 
and further representations. (R. 23-25). In neither 
instance did they plead or attempt to plead "substance 
or effect". No written request for a "substance and 
effect" instruction was made by the plaintiffs, but on 
the contrary they requested the following: 
"Plaintiffs Requested Instruction No. 6. 
"You are instructed that the plaintiffs have 
charged the defendant with making several false 
and fraudulent representations. In this connect-
ion, it is not necessary that the plaintiffs prove 
that each and all of such representations vvere 
made, or that all of sueh representations were 
false. It is sufficient, if the plaintiffs prove by a 
fair preponderance of the endence that any one 
f h t t . d t f 1 :J!: * * " o sue represen .a tons u·as rna e o t~;enz., . 
(Italics added). 
Passing the fact that the request is bad from the 
standpoint of the character of proof required, i. e. clear 
and convincing proof, it evidences that plaintiffs con-
c·eived throughout that they 1nust prove so1ne or all 
of the representations asserted by them. Under these 
circumstances it is obvious that the court did not err 
in failing to givP n substance and effect instruction that 
they not only did not request, but 'vhich would have 
been contrary to 'Yhat they did request. 
Plaintiffs next urge that the court erred in failing 
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to give its Requested Instruction No. 12, to the effect 
that a representation once made would thereafter con-
tinue outstanding until retracted by the defendant or 
until the plaintiffs "had actual knowledge" that such 
repres'entations \Vas false. The part of the request in 
quotes is sufficient in and of itself to make the request 
a misstatement of the law and thus justify its rejection, 
as a reasonable means of knowledge, as distinguished 
fro1n actual knowledge, is all that the law requires, 
(Taylor v. Moore, 87 Utah 493, 51 P. (2) 222), but. 
further than that the court did instruct on the matter 
ofplaintiffs' reliance as follows: 
"In connection with that question, it is the plain-
tiffs' theory of the case that these representations, 
if any you find, \vere continuing after the first 
incident. So in considering this matter of reliance 
and other questions asked you, you may give 
consideration to the question of vvhether or not 
these representations, if 1nade at all, \Vere of a 
continuing nature, so that the plaintiffs may have 
had them in mind, if that be the case, on sub-
sequent transactions." (R. 49). 
We submit, accordingly, that the request as made 
was bad on its face, and, further than that, the part 
that was good was given. 
Further, in connection with this asserted ·error, 
plaintiffs claim that defendant, after he learned from 
experience in the operation of the mine that the engi-
neer's estimates of ore values, costs of production and 
percentage recoveries were in error, had a duty to 
disclose these facts to plaintiffs. We submit that im-
mediately upon the defendant's acquisition of this know-
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ledge it was communicated to plaintiffs, and each and 
every loan made by them was made in the light of this 
knowledge. The matters were, of course, discussed at 
directors' meetings, which plaintiff Dr. Douglas at~ 
tended as a director, commencing February 15, 1951. 
(Tr. 458-462-464), but in addition thereto, and commenc-
ing with the summer of 1950, and before a second loan 
was made, Dr. Douglas was receiving and continued to 
receive full information with regard to the operations, 
including ore values, production costs and recoveries. 
(Tr. 465, 466, 491, 495, 498, 499) He and defendant made 
weekly, or bi-weekly, trips to the mine together, dis-
cussed the problems ·with the operating manager and 
consulting engineers, and the record is replete with 
testimony to the effect that Douglas 'vas fully informed 
and at all times knew that production costs were up and 
recoveries down from those originally anticipated, that 
profits were not being realized, and that moneys addi-
tional to operating revenues "~ere required. Thus, while 
there 1nay have been a duty to disclose changing con-
ditions, the record sho,Ys, and the jury well believed, 
that duty " .. as fully discharged, and the plaintiffs made 
their loans "-ith full kno"-ledge of all of the facts. 
Plaintiffs next assert error in that the court in-
structed the jury that Dr. Douglas w·as a director, when 
that fact "Tas in dispute. The fact of the matter is that 
Dr. Douglas "-as appointed to the board as a director on 
D·ecen1ber 4, 1950, to fill a vaeanry, and "-as elected a 
director at the next annual n1eeting. (Tr. 131, 132). 
He thereaftt'r 8l\rYed as a direr.tor throughout the com-
pany's opPrations, and nt•ver questioned but that he was 
a direetor until after this suit """as brought. Then his 
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only contention was that he was not a director because 
his oath of office had not been filed with the County 
Clerk. Whether he was a de jure director is not im-
portant, for certainly he 'vas acting as such, and as such 
had available to hin1 all corporate information. As 
stated in Barnes v. Eastern and Western Lumber Co., 
(Ore.) 28'7 P (2) 929: 
''Accordingly it was the duty of ~Irs. Spangler, 
as a director, to keep herself informed concern-
ing the assets and activities of the Eastern ~"­
Western Lu1nber Con1pany." 
Beyond that, the court didn't instruct thejury that he 
was a director, but on the contrary, in commenting in 
its instructions on what a reasonable person should ob-
serve and learn, stated: 
"* * * And that's especially true, 1frs. Nylander 
and gentlemen of the jury, if the person happens 
to hold the high office of director in a corpor-
ation." (Italics added). 
The foregoing demonstrates that there was and is 
no error in the court instructions as asserted by plain-
tiffs. We again reiterate, however, that even though 
there 'vas error, it is non-prejudicial in the light of the 
jury's finding against the plaintiffs on the matter of 
whether the representations were or were not made. 
POINT III. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN ANY C011MENTS 
BY IT UPON THE EVIDENCE DURING THE 
COURSE OF ITS INSTRUCTIONS. 
The asserted error here lies in phraseology used 
23 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
by the court in its instruction on· reliance or right of 
reliance by plaintiffs, i. e., did the plaintiffs rely and 
have the right to rely upon the representations claimed 
by them to have been made by defendant. 
The error relied upon appears in those portions of 
the instructions set out at pages 31 and 32 of plaintiffs' 
Brief, and plaintiffs contend the effect thereof was to 
instruct the jury that the Court believed plaintiffs had 
knowledge of the affairs of the corporation or means 
of knowledge. We submit that the language of the court 
cannot be so tortured. What the court said, and all it 
said, was (1) that plaintiffs \Yere obliged to observe and 
learn what a reasonable person \Vould observe and learn, 
and (2) that "ras especially true of corporate matters, 
if the person \Vas a director of the corporation, and (3) 
that if the jury found that the plaintiffs didn't observe 
or learn "\Vhat a reasonable person should have, there 
could be no recovery because there \vas no reliance or 
right of reliance. 
We sub1nit that there \vas no connuent on the evi-
dence itself by the court, but only a fair and accurate 
statement of the la'v as it pertained to plaintiffs' reliance. 
Again, any error in instructions on the matter of 
reliance, if 01Tor ·existed, 'vas of necessity cured by the 
jury finding no representations \\"'ere n1ade, and hence 
there "Tas nothing upon \Yhich reliance could be had. 
POINT I,T. 
THE COURT l)ID NOT ERR IN R,EFlTSING TO AL-
LOW COUNSEL TO READ EXCERPTS FROM A 
TRANSCRII)T OF DEFENDANT'S TESTIMONY 
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DURING FINAL ARGUMENT. 
Plaintiffs' argun1ent on this point is from the stand-
point that their counsel had the absolute right to read 
from the reporter's partial transcript of defendant's 
testimony in his argument to the jury, yet the cases 
he cites in support thereof all demonstrate that the 
granting or denial of such permission is 'vithin the 
discretion of the trial court. 
As appears fro1n the record herein, the testimony 
of the defendant comprises some 226 pages of the trans-
cript, of which some 76 pages \vere as a witll'ess for plain-
tiffs. During the course of the argu1nent plaintiffs' coun-
sel proposed to read to the jury a portion of defendant's 
testin1ony given on behalf of plaintiffs' case, which 
\vould, of course, constitute but a n1inor fraction of his 
entire testimony. Counsel for defendant objected to 
such reading contending that it would be prejudicial, 
and particularly so if but excerpts from the whole \Vere 
to be read. The objection was sustained, and we submit 
properly so. So far as \Ve have been able to ascertain 
the authorities are unani1nous in their holdings that this 
is so1nething that is within the sound discretion of the 
trial court, and some courts take the view that reading 
from a transcript is of doubtful propriety. Even the 
text from American Jurisprudence quoted by plaintiffs 
(Page 38 of their Brief) does not support plaintiffs' 
position, for all it says is that counsel "may repeat the 
evidenee verbatim" or he may "refresh his recollection 
of the testimony by reading frorn the notes of the official 
reporter". Neither, of course is the same as reading to 
the jury from a purported transcript. 
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The general rule on the subject, as we have deter-
mined it, is as stated at 88 C.J.S. Trial, Page 347: 
"It is within the sound discretion of the trial 
court to permit, or to refuse to permit counsel to 
read to the jury from a transcript of the steno-
graphers notes." 
The following cases support the foregoing rule of 
law, and while they are not exhaustive upon the subject, 
do reflect the rule unanimously adopted by the courts 
which have had an opportunity to pass thereon: 
Chicago I. & L. Ry. Co. vs. Gorn~an (Ind) 106 
N. E. 897. 
"Appellant's attorney, while 1naking his argmnent 
to the jury, produced a paper which he stated 
was a copy of the testimony given by said witness 
on cross-examination, and which he proposed to 
read to the jury * * * As evidence is heard in a 
cause, it is presumed that its essential features 
are at that time lodged in the memories of the 
jurors. When the hearing of evidence has been 
finally closed, any practice is at least of doubtful 
propriety the purpose of "~hich is by some subse-
quent procedure to make a primary iinpression 
of the facts in the case upon the 1ninds of the 
jurors. * • * In the trial of a eause many 
1natters 1nust of n~ressity be conunitted to the 
sound discretion of the trial court. He is in the 
midst of the lornl situation. The trial court was 
better able than is this court to deter1nine whether 
or not the use of such transeript \Yas likely to 
hav-e sonH\ un"Tarranted or iinproper effect. We, 
thereforP l1old that the question presented here 
e:une \Vi thin the rea1rn of the sound discretionary 
power of the trial court. Tl1ere is nothing to 
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indicate that such discretion was abused, or that 
appellant suffered any injury from the court's 
ruling.'' 
Wells Fargo & Co. Express v. W. B. Baker Lum-
ber Co. (.Ark) 171 8. W. 132. 
"There was no prejudicial error in the ruling of 
the court in refusing to permit the counsel to 
read excerpts from the deposition, nor in the 
remarks of the court giving his reason for such 
ruling. It is within the sound discretion of the 
court to grant or refuse permission to read ·ex-
cerpts from depositions of witnesses that have 
been read in evidence to the jury. * * * While the 
court might very properly have permitted the 
counsel to read the extracts he desired to read 
in order to show that he was stating the testi-
mony correctly, the court did not err in refusing 
this permission and in thus leaving the Inatter 
to the recollection of the jury who had heard the 
reading of the deposition." 
McConkie 1:. Babcock, Iou'a 70 N. W. 103. 
"It seems to us, of necessity, the right to read 
any part or portion of the evidence of a 'vi tness 
which is given in the case on trial to the jury 
must be a matter largely within the discretion 
of the trial judge; and we ~hould not be justified 
in reversing a cause, because of a ruling of the 
trial judge relating thereto, unless it is reasonably 
clear that he has abused his discretion to the 
prejudice of the complaining party. * * * Hold-
ing, as we do, that it is a rnatter resting in the 
sound discretion of the trial judge, we see no 
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Westling v. Holm (Minn.) 58 N. W. (2) 252. 
"(6) We have held that reading parts of testi-
money from a court reporter's transcript thereof 
is permissible in the discretion of the trial court. 
Aasen v. Aasen, 228 Minn. 1, 36 N. W. 2d 27; 
Bonderson v. Hovde, 150 1\finn. 175, 184 N. W. 
853. As stated in the Aasen case, 228 lVlinn. 7 36 
N. W. 2d 31: 
' * * * the conduct of a trial generally rests 
in the discretion of the trial court. This in-
cludes the practice of reading to the jury 
excerpts from the court reporter's trans-
cript.'" 
Gephart v. Stout (Wash.) 118 P. (2) 801. 
"It is within the sound discretion of the trial 
court to permit, or to refuse to pern1it, counsel 
in his argument to read matter to the jury from 
a transcript of the stenographer's notes." 
Smith v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. (Wash.) 140 P. 
685. 
"How many times a witness 1nay be recalled on 
a particular matter, or how many tin1es his evi-
dence may be repeated to the jury, rests in the 
sound discretion of the court, to be revie,ved only 
for abuse. Here "\Ye find no abuse of discretion. 
The attorney "\Vas not denied the right to refresh 
his memory from the stenographic notes, or from 
any memorandum he 1nay have 1nade of the evi-
dence other,Yi~e, nor "Tas he denied the right of 
stating to the jury his re1nernbrance of the testi-
mony of any witness, nor fro1n dra"\Ying any 
deduction or conrlusion he chose to draw there-
fron1. He 'vas denied only the right to doing 
what amounted virtually to a recall of the wit-
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ness and have him repeat to the jury what he 
had testified on a particular matter. Doubtless 
in the interests of truth and justice the trial judge 
Inay permit such a practice ; but it does not belong 
to either litigant to demand it as an absolute 
right." 
The comments of the court in Smith v. Northern 
Pac. Ry. Co., supra, appear particularly applicable here. 
Plaintiffs' counsel was not precluded from refreshing 
his own recollection from the transcript, and it is to 
be assum·ed that he had done so as he had it in his pos-
session and had determined just what parts he wanted 
to read, and what to exclude, nor 'vas he denied the 
right of stating to the jury what the testimony of the 
'vitness 'vas after having refreshed his recollection, or 
from drawing any deduction or conclusion therefrom 
that he chose. He was denied only the privilege of doing 
'vhat amounted virtually to a recall of a witness, after 
all of the testimony was in and both sides had rested, 
to the end of having a portion of his testimony repeated. 
Any permission to read less than the whol'e of the testi-
mony would result, through the action of the court in 
granting the permission, in the undue emphasizing of 
the portions read to the exclusion of the portions not 
read. Error might well result from the granting of 
such permission, but never from its refusal. 
POINT V. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO 
DIRECT A VERDICT IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFFS 
ON THE TRANSACTION OF DECEMBER 4, 1950. 
Plaintiffs do not argue that they were entitled to 
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a directed verdict as to all of the transactions, but only 
as to the one of December 4, 1950. Consideration of 
this point presents the opportunity to defendant of 
demonstrating not only that plaintiffs were not entitled 
to this directed verdict, but that defendant was entitled 
to and should have been granted a directed verdict as 
to all transactions. 
1. The representations. 
The representations relied upon were as follows, 
albeit all were not asserted as to each cause of action: 
(a) 300,000 tons were blocked out; 
(b) ranging in value from $4.00 to $50.00 per ton, 
with average value of $7.00 p·er ton; 
(c) costs of producing the gold of $3.50 per ton; 
(d) a substantial profit would be realized; 
(e) no investor would lose a penny; 
(f) would not borrovv more than company could 
repay out of profits; 
(g) the company was doing well ; 
(h) shipping considerable ore; 
(i) realizing a profit; 
( j) loan necessary for a short time only; 
(k) opportunity to sell mine for $2,000,000 but mine 
worth more than that. 
As this court has held on many occasions, a repre-
sentation to be actionable 1nust be as to a present ma-
terial fact, and n1ust be rnaterially false, and the burden 
of proof is on the plaintiffs. Statements as to future 
events, or of opinion, are not actionable. 
For exarnple in the ca~ of Ackerman v. Bt·attn.well 
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Investment Company, 80 Utah 52, 12 P. (2) 623, plain-
tiff purchased a third party's note from defendant. The 
note subsequently proved to be worthless, and plaintiff 
sought to recover its value from defendant on the ground 
that it had been 1nisrepresented. Among the represen-
tations relied upon were "the note was good as gold", 
and "the defendant T~vould see that plaintiff didn't lose a 
penny on the note". This court there said: 
"The representations that the note was 'good as 
gold' and that the Investment Company (defend-
ant) would see that the plaintiff 'did not lose a 
penny' in and of themselves are Inatters of mere 
opinion, exagerated statements, and trade talk, 
and are not actionable." 
In Kinnear v. Prows, 81 Utah 135, 16 P. (2) 1094, 
among the representations relied upon were (a) the 
company owned property worth $55,000, (b) the com-
pany was doing well and was a paying business, (c) the 
stock was good as gold, and (d) the company paid divi-
dends of 10%. In commenting upon these representa-
tions the court said : 
"It is apparent fro1n a reading of the alleged 
representations relied on that many of thern were 
mere expressions of opinion which do not con-
stitute actionable fraud~" 
The court singled out the representation that the 
company was paying dividends as being a statement of a 
present material fact which if false and relied on, would 
be actionable. 
In Hull v. Flinders, 83 Utah 158, 27 P. (2) 56, there 
were included representations that the company was 
31 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
"safe as any bank in Ogden" and "its bonds were as 
good as gold coin". They were construed to be mere 
expressions of opinion and not actionable. 
In Campbell v. Zions Coop Home Building & Real 
Estate Co. 46 Utah 1, 148 P. 401, the court said: 
"The statements that investors 'vill 'get hand-
some returns,' that their 'investments will be 
safe,' that 'fortunes had been 1nade in the same 
line,' that the 'stock was worth a dollar a share 
and would double in value,' that purchasers 'could 
not lose, took no chance,' that if they ''Yere dis-
satisfied with their stock the con1pany "\vould buy 
it back at par,' and staten1ents concerning the 
mere worth or value of the defendant's holdings 
or assets, future costs and expenses of operation, 
future profits to be derived from the business, 
or from the purchase of stocks or other invest-
ments, the future ability of the defendant to pay 
dividends, and other similar expressions and 
statements, that 'the purchase of 5,000 shares 
would make the purchaser independent for life, 
would not have to work any more,' that 'this is 
the biggest thing I ever knew in 1ny life, the 
biggest in the state, the best thing ever sold, a 
n1ighty good thing,' and other similar statements 
and expressions are 1nere opinions, beliefs, future 
pron1ises, assurances, or happenings, or 'trade 
talk' and 'puffings,' and not, in then1selves, action-
able." 
From the face of the record, assuming the repre-
sentations were 1nade as alleged (the jury finding to the 
contrary), the following is apparent: 
Representation (a) is not 1naterial, as it is 1ncon-
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sequential whether the ore was blocked out or not, the 
ilnportant thing being \vhether it was there, and there 
was no allegation or proof, nor attempt by plaintiffs to 
prove, that there were not available 300,000 tons of ore 
on the properties. Further than that as operations 
discontinued after the 1nining of 113,000 tons, it is of 
no consequence \vhether there are 87,000 tons left, or 
187,000 tons. 
Representation (b) was not proven false. It is 
without contradiction that assays showed a spread in 
value vvithin the range indicated. Tons mined were 
slightly below the average in value, but there was but 
a fraction of the total tonnage extracted. 
Representations (c) an (d) were but opinions when 
originally made, later corrected to plaintiffs' knowledge. 
Representations (e) and (f) were but opinions. 
Representation (g) is so relative as to be meaning-
less, and is further but an op1n1on. In other words, 
"doing well" in comparison to what~ 
Representation (h) \vas not proven false. In fact 
its truth is established by the fact that 113,000 tons were 
1nined and process'ed, and over $350,000.00 worth of 
gold shipped to the 1nint. 
Representation (i) could have no application to the 
first transaction, as the company then was, to plaintiffs' 
own knowledge, not in operation, and as to subsequent 
transactions was contrary to plaintiffs' O\Vn kno,vledge 
of the facts. 
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Thus none of the representations alleged to have 
been made were actionable, either becauS'e they were 
but expressions of opinion, or because the plaintiffs 
knew the contrary, or because their falsity was not 
established. 
A further reason why no prima facie cause of action 
was proven as to any transaction is because of the com-
plete absence of any proof of dan1age. A fraud action 
is unlike other tort actions in that damage is an elen1ent 
of tlre offense itself, and must be proven the same as 
the other elements, and by the same clear and con-
vincing proof. Kinnear v. Prows) supra. 
Plaintiffs' contention, and their only proof, was 
that as the Duvall Company became insolvent and 
liquidated in the late fall of 1953, and as a consequenC'e 
was then unable to pay its notes to plaintiffs (and 
others), plaintiffs ipso facto were damaged as a con-
sequence of defendant's alleged fraud to the full antount 
of the unpaid notes) plus accrued interest thereon. 
These notes, by their terms, 1natured fron1 over one 
year to over two years prior to the time the company 
discontinued its operations. The latest maturing note 
was that of July 1, 1952, \Vhich matured October 1, 1952, 
and the earlier notes matured in the sunnner of 1951. 
No demand was ever 1nade by plaintiffs for their pay-
ment, nor any proof offered by plaintiffs to show that 
the company wouldn't or couldn't have paid at 1naturity. 
In fact the testimony affirinat~ely shows a continuing 
operation fron1 over t'vo years after the earlier notes 
matured, to over one year after n1aturity of the last 
note. True it is that during this period the con1pany 
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was to soin'e extent operating on borro"\ved money (al-
though Exhibit l\1 reflects that in 1952 the company had 
receipts from ore sales amounting to $99,239.71, and in 
1953 amounting to $169,131.20), and payment of plain-
tiffs' notes, if pay1nent had been den1anded, might well 
have been from other borrowings, but this is certainly 
of no significance. 11any operating businesses pay their 
1naturing obligations from borrowed capital. Nor does 
the evidence shovv that the ultimate liquidation proxi-
mately followed fron1 the falsity of any actionable rep-
resentation but on the contrary the record discloses 
(Tr. 127-130) that it was the constantly rising costs of 
materials and labor following the commencement of the 
Korean War, inability to make percentage recoveries 
in accordance with laboratory tests, and a combination 
of circumstances that finally forced the close down. 
This court has held, Kinnear v. Prows, supra, Pace 
v. Parrish, supra, that the 1neasure of damages in a 
fraud action is the difference in value as of the time of 
the fraud, of the property received by plaintiffs, and 
the value the property \vould have had if defendant's 
representations had been true. In other words, in the 
instant case, the difference in the value of these notes 
when received by plaintiffs, and their then value had 
defendant's alleged representations been true. 
Thus the element of damages in this case required 
proof by the plaintiffs that at the time they received 
each of such notes, the actual value thereof was in fact 
less than the face a1nount thereof. No proof whatever 
was made or offered along these lines, but on the con-
trary plaintiffs offered only to prove that the co1npany 
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was unable to pay them from over one to nearly three 
years later by reason of its then insolvency, resulting 
from a combination of factors in no wise related to the 
alleged representations. 
In Hecht v. Metzler, 14 Utah 408, this court an-
nounced th'e rule to be in a fraud action: 
"With reference to damages, the case must he 
tried just as it would have been tried the daY 
after the contract was made, if the question had 
arisen at that time." 
Assuming for the sake of the argument that in the 
case of promissory notes, the time of determining value 
is as of their maturity date, rather than date of delivery, 
(although we find no authority to support this assump-
tion) there is absolutely no evidence 'vhatever that their 
then value was less than their face value. The fact that 
the co1npany continued operations from one to two years 
after the notes matured, with operating incon1e during 
the two years approximating $270,000., indicates that 
the then value of these notes ''"as not less than their 
face value. On the other hand, the only proof, or offer 
of proof, by the plaintiffs relating to value of the notes, 
was that at some 1nuch later date the co1npany becan1e 
insolvent, and so couldn't pay then1. 
As stated in Kinnear v. Prows, supra: 
"There is no PYidence 'vhatever of the real or 
market value of this stock at the tin~e it ,zra.s trans-
ferred to plaintiffs, or of the financial condition 
of the con1pany, and hence no eYidence of injury 
or da.Inage by reason of such false repre~enta­
tions. We cannot prcszone the val~te to be les~ 
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than represented because it might well be that 
earnings of the corporation, if any, remained in 
the treasury or \\Tei·e used to extend and develop 
the property and business of the corporation, in 
which event the value of the stock might be equal 
to or greater than as represented. * * *. With 
respect to this particular item there was therefore 
no sufficient evidence to go to the jury on the 
question of injury or damage." (Italics added) 
Not dissimilar to our case on this point was that of 
Menefee v. Blitz, (Ore.) 179 P. (2) 550, albeit in that 
cas'e oil was involved instead of gold, and corporate 
stock instead of corporate notes. Upon the subject of 
value, the court said: 
"The evidence indicates, in our opinion, that the 
stock possessed value on the day of its purchase. 
We shall now recite the facts upon which we 
base that state1nent. The stock under consider-
ation vvas issued by a corporation which was 
seeking to extract hidden treasure, in the form 
of oil, from the bowels of the earth. It rnight 
develop that there was no oil in the stratum for 
'vhich the drill \\T<ls headed, but the things which 
man hopes he vvill find in the unkno,vn often 
lend to a project rnore value than the things 
which he actually possesses. The corporation 
in which the respondent bought his stock was 
following a plan of action which was devised by 
a competent geologist; the latter was in charge 
of the drill. At the beginning it was thought 
that oil in large quantities would be found in the 
Vaqueros sand and that the latter would be en-
countered at a depth of about 3,000 feet. It was 
assumed, however, that it rnight be necessary to 
go down much deeper. When the respondent 
37 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
purchased his stock, the drill had not yet reached 
the Vaqueros sand. When the drilling stopped 
in September, 1937, hopes of discovering oil had 
not been abandoned. They \Yere still entertained 
notwithstanding discouraging developrnents. The 
cessation of activities was 'because they ran out 
of money and the equipn1ent was no good.' Those 
are the words of the respondent himself." 
We submit, accordingly, that not only were the 
plaintiffs not entitled to any directed verdict but on 
the face of the record from the damage standpoint alone, 
defendant was entitled to a directed verdict as to each 
transaction in accordance with his motion therefor (Tr. 
590). 
Now, specifically as to the transaction of Decem-
ber 4, 1950, which plaintiffs assert should have been 
the subject of a directed verdict in their favor. In this 
connection they argue that "\vhen this loan \Vas n1ade 
defendant then knew by experience that the engineers 
estimates of ore values and production costs \vere in 
error, and that in failing to disclose that error he conl-
mitted actionable fraud. 
What, however, are the facts? The facts are that 
the mill was completed and placed in partial operation 
in August, 1950. Bet\Yeen that date and "Then it closed 
for the winter in Noven1ber, a few trial runs "\Yere made. 
The ore that was run \vas \vithin the 1ninimum value 
of $3.50 or $4.00, so there \Vas no falsity there. Bugs 
developed in the operation of the n1ill, as often happens 
in any new operation of this type, and as a consequence 
production costs \vere up and recoveries do\vn, but the 
engineers imn1ediately recon1mended changes and alter-
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ations in the mill vvhich they believed would rectify the 
trouble and bring costs and recoveries within their 
original estimates. Certainly it cannot be said that the 
defendant then knew that these engineers, among the 
top in their fields, would be unable to produce the re-
sults they had said they could. On the contrary defend-
ant had implicit faith and trust in their ability, and, 
in fact, had backed it up by putting another $12,000.00 
of his own 1noney in on October 27, 1950. And further 
than that, as previously pointed out, plaintiffs through 
their frequent trips to the mine during the summer 
and fall of 1950, and through their discussions with the 
operating engineer and with defendant, were fully ap-
prised of the difficulties that attended these first ore 
runs through the mill, and of the plans to atte1npt to 
correct them. These facts \Vere all brought home to 
plaintiffs, and plaintiffs r.a.ay not deny that on Decem-
ber 4, 1950, they were not completely informed thereof. 
CONCLUSION 
As this court has heretofore recognized (State v. 
Seymour, 49 Utah 285, 163 P. 789.) disappointrnent fre-
quently follows investments having for their ultimate 
object the extraction of the earth's treasures, and this 
is particularly so of those undertakings of a speculative 
nature. Returns of the contemplated enterprise may 
fall far below expectations of the prornoters, regardless 
of their honesty of purpose and integrity. Prime ex-
amples of this characteristic of the speculative venture 
are to he found in the current rise and fall in the values 
of oil and uraniun1 securities. 
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Thus it is that when an enterprise fails, or en-
counters less than anticipated success, charges of mis-
representation and fraud are easily made by those who 
are willing only to ride with the winners. Words and 
phrases honestly used to describe the nature, object8 and 
purposes of the enterprise are seized upon and torn 
from context, and twisted and tortured for the sole pur-
pose of making them appear ugly and deceitful and 
fraudulent. So it is that in actions of this type the law 
requires clear and convincing proof of the alleged fraud, 
and carefully scrutinizes the evidence upon \vhich the 
complainant relies for recovery. 
The record in this case is long and somewhat tedious 
to read. It does disclose, however, affirmatively and 
beyond doubt, that defendant's actions and conduct to-
ward plaintiffs was at all time above reproach. Before 
embarking on any operation that required funds over 
and beyond those that he and his associates, Barrett 
and Froerer, were able to contribute, he procured the 
assistance of men and organizations 'vho were experts 
in the field, Pierce, Romney and the testing laboratories 
of American Cynamid Corporation. If error \Yas pres-
ent in their conclusions as to the feasibility of the pro-
ject, the error was theirs and they ackno,vledged it. 
After trial runs during the first year disclosed that 
results were not up to expectations, the assistance and 
advice of these experts was continued, and additional 
exp'erts, Den1psey and Heiginbothan1, 'vere called in. 
Plaintiff F. E. Douglas not only had the means of kno,v-
ledge as to :everything that "Tas going on by virtue of 
acting as a director of the corporation, but had actual 
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knowledge thereof through direct conversations with 
defendant and the operating managers of the company. 
When plaintiffs' earlier loans matured, they not only 
did not press for payment thereof, but continued to 
rnake further loans, and it was only when the company, 
fro1n one to two years later, was forced to liquidate 
for reasons no one foresaw or could have forseen, that 
plaintiffs first raised the cry of fraud and deceit. 
These matters were all before the jury. The jurors 
saw and heard the actual testimony of plaintiffs and 
defendant, were cognizant of the conflict therein, and 
formed their own opinions of wherein lay the truth. 
Fifty-four interrogatories were propounded to them, 
each one directed specifically to an essential ·element 
of the alleged fraud, and fifty-four negative answers 
were the response. Six negative answers-one to each 
transaction-would have been sufficient, but the jury, 
having heard the evidence, was disinclined to per1nit any 
factual facet of the case to go unanswered. 
We submit that the plaintiffs have had their day 
in court, and have completely failed factually to prove 
a single element of actionable fraud. The jury so found, 
and the judgment of the lower court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HOWELL, STINE AND OLMSTEAD, 
RICHARD W. CAMPBELL, 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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